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Counterclaim and Countersuit Harassment of Private Environ-
mental Plaintiffs: The Problem, Its Implications, and Pro-
posed Solutions 
The National Environmental Policy Act of 19691 established a 
national goal of environmental preservation and improvement2 that 
Congress and the states have sought to achieve by enacting various 
legislation. 3 While enforcement of many of the statutes has been 
entrusted exclusively to government agencies, 4 recent years have 
witnessed an increasing realization that effective environmental im-
provement is possible only if private citizens are allowed and encour-
aged to participate in the enforcement process. 6 The recent liberal-
ization of standing requirements for civil suits in general0 has 
facilitated citizen enforcement of environmental protection laws. 
Moreover, many recent environmental protection acts contain spe-
cific provisions authorizing citizen enforcement through private liti-
gation. 7 Parties whose interests are threatened by environmental 
suits, however, have jeopardized the continued development and fu-
ture effectiveness of citizen enforcement of environmental protection 
1. 42 u.s.c. §§ 4321-47 (1970). 
2. "The Congress ••. declares that it is the continuing policy of the Federal 
Government, in cooperation with State and local governments, and other concerned 
private and public organizations, to use all practicable means and measures . • • in 
a manner calculated to foster and promote general welfare, to create and maintain 
conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony ...• " Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 101 (a), 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (a) (1970). 
3. See, e.g., Wild Life Restoration Act, 16 U.S.C. § 669 (1970); Endangered Spe-
cies Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-43 (Supp. III, 1973); Environmental Education 
Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1531-36 (1970), as amended, Environmental Education Amend-
ments of 1974, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531, 1532, 1536 (Supp. 1975); Environmental Qual-
ity Improvement Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4371-74 (1970). 
4. See, e.g., Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1377 (Supp. 
III, 1973); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(e) (Supp. III, 1973); 
Oil Pollution Act Amendments, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1007 (Supp. 1975), 
5. See J. SAX, DEFENDING TIIE ENVIRONMENT 63 (1970). 
6. See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Proce-
dures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 699 (1973). 
7. Congress expressly provided for citizen enforcement of environmental regula-
tions in the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1970), and the Water Pollution 
Control Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-65 (Supp. III, 1973). At least 
seven states now have environmental protection acts that contemplate both private 
and public enforcement of their provisions. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-
14 to -20 (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.412 (1975); IND. ANN. STAT. CODE§§ 13-
6-1-1 to -6 (Bums 1973); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 214, § 7A (Supp. 1974); MICH. 
COMP. LAws 691.120-.1207 (1970); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 116B.Ol-.13 (Supp. 1975); 
S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 21-lOA-1 to -15 (Supp. 1974). Many of these statutes 
were drafted to avoid litigation over the standing of any legal entity to bring suit. 
See, e.g., Michigan Environmental Protection Act § 2(1), M1cH. COMP, LAWS § 
691.1202 (1970). 
106 
November 1975] Harassment of Environmental Plaintiffs 107 
laws by devising a new litigation strategy-the assertion of a multi-
million dollar counteraction (either counterclaim or countersuit) 
against the environmental plaintiff. Designed both to harass plain-
tiffs into compromising or withdrawing their suits and to discourage 
future suits by either the present plaintiff or other prospective plain-
tiffs, this strategy has had measurable effects. 
This Note first outlines the basic characteristics of the counterac-
tion strategy and considers the implications of its future proliferation 
and then analyzes proposals to eliminate or ameliorate the impact 
of the strategy in terms of their effectiveness and practicability. 8 
I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COUNTERACTION STRATEGY 
A counteraction may take the form of either a counterclaim or 
a countersuit and may be initiated either by an original defendant 
in the environmental protection suit or by a party whose interest 
would be indirectly affected by the outcome of that suit. Both 
forms, as employed in the environmental context, share several gen-
eral characteristics. First, counteraction liability is, with few excep-
tions, based on one or more of five common-law torts:9 defama-
tion, 10 malicious prosecution,11 abuse of process, 12 interference with 
contractual relations, and interference with prospective advantage.18 
8. The information upon which this Note is based was gathered by sending letters 
inquiring about familiarity with the counteraction technique to about 150 national 
and local environmental organizations known to have been involved in litigation and 
to about 50 private environmental plaintiffs or plaintiffs' attorneys. About 90 per 
cent of those inquiries were answered. A few responses indicated no awareness of 
the tactic, many showed a general awareness of the tactic but no direct experience, 
some indicated an awareness of specific instances without personal experience, and 
others indicated some direct experience as objects of the tactic. Detailed discussions 
followed with those environmental groups and attorneys who had had direct expe-
rience with the tactic. Over-all, these groups and attorneys were extremely willing 
to provide information and displayed concern regarding the use of the tactic. 
9. Other theories are also relied upon, depending upon the facts of the particular 
case. For example, in Property Dev. Group v. Irish, No. 7265 (Cir. Ct. Washtenaw 
County, Mich., filed Dec. 14, 1972), and Apfel v. Cook, No. 926 (Cir. Ct. Antrim 
County, Mich., June 23, 1973 ), the counteractions alleged civil conspiracy among the 
individuals who brought the original action. Claims for such obscure actions as "of-
ficious intermeddling" have also been asserted. 
10. See, e.g., Adams v. Town of Rockland, No. 989 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan County, 
N.Y., filed June 11, 1971); Property Dev. Group v. Irish, No. 7265 (Cir. Ct. Wash-
tenaw County, Mich., filed Dec. 14, 1972); Apfel v. Cook, No. 926 (Cir. Ct. Antrim 
County, Mich., June 23, 1973). 
1 I. See, e.g., Adams v. Town of Rockland, No. 989 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan County, 
N.Y., filed June 11, 1971); Tanton v. Department of Natural Resources, No. 90-3 
(Cir. Ct. Ingham County, Mich., Dec. 30, 1972). 
12. Cf. A.I. Lane Constr. Corp. v. Hawkes, Civ. No. 73-3586-C (D. Mass. filed 
June 29, 1973, dismissed March 25, 1975, refiled April 24, 1975) (suit in response 
to petition of state agency on the validity of the issuance of a permit). 
13. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972). Cf. 
McKeon Corp. v. Kennedy, No. 221454 (Super. Ct. Sacramento County, Cal., Jan. 
5, 1972) (suit in response to speech at public hearing). 
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Generally, the theory of counteraction liability is determined by the 
technique chosen by the environmental group to promote environ-
mental quality. Groups that rely upon publication to create aware-
ness of environmental dangers are likely to face a defamation 
counteraction; those that rely primarily on the judicial forum more 
often face a counteraction alleging abuse of process or malicious 
prosecution. Second, the counteraction invariably includes a request 
for damages in the prayer for relief.14 Typically, an astronomical 
sum is requested; claims often range between $40 and $80 million.1G 
Third, the litigant asserting the counteraction is usually a private 
party with a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the suit: govern-
mental units have rarely utilized the tactic.16 Fourth, the targets of 
the counteraction are almost exclusively local and ad hoc environ-
mental groups and individuals. Originally, counteractions were also 
brought to harass established national environmental organizations, 17 
but the willingness of these organizations to litigate the counterac-
tions seems to have halted the practice.18 
The final and perhaps most interesting characteristic of these 
counteractions is that they are rarely litigated.10 Because most are 
14. In addition to damages, declaratory and injunctive relief are often sought. 
See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (requesting injunc-
tions against future interference with contractual relations). 
15. Claims for both punitive and compensatory damages in excess of $10 million 
are quite common. See, e.g., McKeon Corp. v. Kennedy, No. 221454 (Super. Ct. 
Sacramento County, Cal., Jan. 5, 1973) (requesting $80 million); Sierra Club v. 
Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (requesting $20 million); Apfel v. Cook, 
No. 926 (Cir. Ct. Antrim County, Mich., June 23, 1973) (requesting $12.5 million). 
16. However, counteractions may be asserted in response to original suits against 
the government. See Adams v. Town of Rockland, No. 989 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan 
County, N.Y., filed June 11, 1971). There is some evidence of counteraction threats 
by government officials, although none of these threats has yet materialized into a 
counteraction. See Letter from Environmental Defense Fund, East Setauket, N.Y., 
Sep. 5, 1974, on file with the Michigan Law Review [hereinafter EDF Letter]. 
17. Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972), was one of the first 
(and least successful) documented attempts to use the counteraction tactic. 
18. James Moorman, attorney for the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, stated in 
a telephone conversation on Nov. 31, 1974, that Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 
934 (N.D. Cal. 1972), represented the last serious attempt to use counteraction har-
assment against the Sierra Club, and that counteractions are no longer a problem for 
that organization. The National Audubon Society has not been the object of threat-
ened suits designed to inhibit its litigation but its local branches have faced such ac-
tions. Letter from Louis R. Proyect, attorney, Oct. 1, 1974, on file with the Michi-
gan Law Review. The Environmental Defense Fund has received frequent threats 
of counteractions and countersuits but none has yet materialized. EDF Letter, supra 
note 16. 
19. Only three litigated cases have been discovered. Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. 
Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972), and McKeon Corp. v. Kennedy, No. 221454 (Super. 
Ct. Sacramento County, Cal., Jan. 5, 1972), were dismissed after argument on sum-
mary judgment. Apfel v. Cook, No. 926 (Cir. Ct. Antrim County, Mich., June 22, 
1973), was also dismissed in summary judgment but was subsequently refiled. The 
overwhelming majority of counteractions never make it past the pleading stage. For 
example, Adams v. Town of Rockland, No. 989 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan County, N.Y., 
filed June 11, 1971), has remained inactive with no motion for summary judgment 
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brought for harassment or bargaining purposes, they are withdrawn 
during the litigation of the original environmental claim or concur-
rently with the withdrawal or compromise of the environmental 
claim. In those known counteractions that have been litigated to 
a decision, environmental litigants have uniformly prevailed. 
The counteraction strategy seeks to produce two results. The 
immediate objective is to cause the environmentalist to withdraw or 
compromise his suit. The litigant asserting the counteraction typ-
ically makes an offer to the environmental plaintiff for reciprocal dis-
missal of pending actions. 20 While this offer is rarely accepted, the 
mere existence of the counteraction and the consequent threat of in-
curring enormous liability puts pressure upon the environmental 
plaintiff to settle his claim rather than litigate it. 21 The second goal 
of counteractions is to discourage future suits.22 A multi-million dol-
lar counteraction in one suit portends the possibility of such counter-
actions in future suits23 and thus may inhibit environmentalists from 
litigating meritorious claims. 24 If the financial burden of bringing 
an environmental suit necessarily includes the cost of defending a 
counteraction, environmentalists may determine that use of the liti-
gation technique is infeasible in most instances. 
The counteraction strategy is most successful against ad hoc 
groups and small environmental organizations. Inexperienced in lit-
igation25 and often formed merely to challenge a single environ-
or trial since 1971. Letter from David B. Sive, attorney, Sep. 16, 1974, on file with 
the Michigan Law Review [hereinafter Sive Letter]. 
20. See, e.g., Letter from David G. Knibb, attorney, Nov. 25, 1974, on file with 
the Michigan Law Review [hereinafter Knibb Letter], discussing Alpine Lakes Pro-
tection Soc. v. Harden, No. 8885 (W.D. Wash., filed 1971); Complaint at 13, Three 
Lakes Assn. v. Whiting, No. 74-025-272 (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich., Jan. 1975) 
[hereinafter Three Lakes Assn. Complaint]. 
21. However, some attorneys whose clients have faced counteractions refuse to 
take them seriously. See, e.g., Letter from Joseph W. Wilcox, attorney, Oct. 25, 
1974, on file with the Michigan Law Review [hereinafter Wilcox Letter]. Other at-
torneys have observed that a frivolous counterclaim "tends to solidify plaintiffs' re-
solve rather than scare them," Letter from George Snyder, attorney, Oct. 29, 1974, 
on file with the Michigan Law Review [hereinafter Snyder Letter], although environ-
mentalists who hear of such counteractions by public rumor are deeply concerned. 
See id. 
22. One possible effect of a counteraction is the depletion of the financial re-
sources of the environmentalist against whom it is asserted, which thus prevents him 
from bringing future actions. See Snyder Letter, supra note 21. 
23. The environmentalists seem to be as well acquainted with the existence and 
operation of this tactic as their attorneys. See Letter from J. Richard Aramburu, 
attorney, Oct. 25, 1974, on file with the Michigan Law Review. 
24. See Sive Letter, supra note 19 ("The threat of countersuit is constantly with 
attorneys bringing such suit and the organizations they represent. Regardless of with 
how much assurance . . • attorneys can advise potential plaintiffs that counterclaims 
will probably be dismissed, there is a real problem"); Sax & DiMento, Environmental 
Citizen Suits: Three Years Experience Under the Michigan Environmental Protec-
tion Act, 4 Eco. LQ. 1, 22 (1974). 
25. Sax & DiMento, supra note 24, at 7. 
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mental danger, such groups rarely possess the resources to carry on 
a prolonged legal battle. 26 Group members in many instances evi-
dence a great fear of incurring extensive liability in the litigation of 
environmental claims: They seek to ensure a healthy environment 
but balk at the possibility of incurring multi-million dollar liability 
in the process. 
The widespread use and success of the counteraction tactic could 
have far-reaching consequences. Many state environmental protec-
tion acts grant private citizens standing to litigate27 and contain pro-
visions to minimize the cost of bringing suit under them. 28 The via-
bility of these acts depends in large measure upon citizen willingness 
to engage in private environmental litigation. 2° Citizen suits prod 
administrative agencies into dealing with environmental problems80 
and violators into complying with statutes. 81 By discouraging citizen 
litigation through the threat of liability and litigation expense, the 
counteraction tactic undermines a principal means of enforcing state 
environmental protection acts. 82 As a result, the enforcement of en-
vironmental regulations may be left exclusively to government agen-
cies, rendering the environment once again a ward of administrative 
discretion. 88 
The implications of the counteraction tactic extend beyond its 
chilling effect upon environmental protection. Practically, the tactic 
26. Not only will the environmentalist group's resources affect the initial decision 
to go to trial, see id. at 51, but they will determine the over-all impact of a counter-
action on the group. See Wilcox Letter, supra note 21. Those groups that depend 
upon ad hoc fund raising are particularly susceptible to compromise when faced with 
counteractions. See Letter from Mrs. Lindsay C. Smith, Clean Water Chairman of 
the Alabama Conservancy, Jan. 1, 1975, on file with the Michigan Law Review. 
Furthermore, the expenses incurred in defending counteractions may reduce the funds 
available for the groups' ongoing activities. See Three Lakes Assn. Complaint, supra 
note 20, at 29-30. 
21. See statutes cited in note 7 supra. See generally 2 ENV. L. REV. 313 (1972). 
28. For example, section 2(a) of the Michigan Environmental Protection Act, 
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1202a (Supp. 1975), sets $500 as maximum security 
that a plaintiff may be required to post. It was recognized that the liberal standing 
provisions of the Act would be futile if another section of the Act exposed environ-
mentalist plaintiffs to substantial costs in bringing suit. Sax & Conner, Michigan's 
Environmental Protection Act: A Progress Report, 10 MICH. L. REV, 1003, 1077 
(1972). 
29. See J. SAX, supra note 5, at 113; Hadden, The Socio-Economic Aspects of 
Private Environmental Litigation, 43 J. URBAN L. 607, 612 (1972); Sax & DiMento, 
supra note 24, at 2. 
30. See Hadden, supra note 29, at 613 ("Regulatory agencies are more often vic-
tims than villains, and well-placed law suits naming them as defendants can liberate 
them from unwarranted political pressure"); Sax & Conner, supra note 28, at 1080. 
See also Sax & DiMento, supra note 24, at 12. 
31. J. SAX, supra note 5, at 231. 
32. Sax & Conner, supra note 28, at 1004-05. 
33. The breakdown in effective environmental regulation caused by administrative 
discretion may have prompted legislatures to provide for private enforcement. See 
Sax & Conner, supra note 28, at 1005. 
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wastes the judicial resources necessary to supervise the filing of sham 
pleadings, to set up pre-trial conferences and discovery, and to con-
duct a formal trial. With the workload of courts increasing at almost 
astronomical rates, 34 the expenditure of judicial resources for other 
than settling genuine disputes is especially odious. Moreover, the 
tactic challenges the ability of private citizens to enforce their rights 
in the judicial setting and thus undercuts what is perhaps the most 
expeditious way for an ordinary citizen to reaffirm his belief in our 
governmental system: 
The opportunity for anyone to obtain at least a hearing and honest 
consideration of matters that he feels important must not be under-
estimated. The availability of the judicial forum means that access 
to government is a reality for the ordinary citizen-that he can be 
heard, and that, in a setting of equality, he can require bureaucrats 
and even the biggest industries to respond to his questions and justify 
themselves before a disinterested auditor .... 35 
In the extreme, the counteraction technique threatens to destroy 
whatever equality exists in the judicial setting. The openness of the 
courts becomes a myth if an affluent party, through the assertion of 
a multimillion dollar counterclaim or countersuit, can effectively 
force an environmentalist out of court. 
There is one important caveat to this extensive indictment of 
counterclaims and countersuits in environmental protection actions. 
While the motives of environmentalists might generally be laudable, 
there is always a possibility that they will either intentionally or un-
consciously assert a frivolous environmental claim.36 Consequently, 
a counteraction may have merit. Any proposed solution to the 
counteraction problem must recognize and preserve the rights of 
those asserting meritorious counteractions. 
II. COUNTERACTION THEORIES AND DEFENSES 
This section describes the various counteraction theories of liabil-
ity. Because few counteraction cases are litigated to a decision and 
because most of those decided are not reported, 37 the factual circum-
stances surrounding the counteraction tactic have largely gone un-
34. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 260 n.14 (1973) (Powell, J., 
Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
35. J. SAX, supra note 5, at 112 (emphasis original). 
36. For instance, a frivolous environmental suit may arise when a large con-
tractor on a multimillion dollar construction project faces a stringent completion 
deadline that he must meet to avoid substantial monetary penalties. An environ-
mental group, knowing of no real harm created by the project, nevertheless may bring 
suit to enjoin construction and thereby obtain a monetary settlement from the pres-
sured contractor that will enrich its own treasury. In such circumstances, there is 
no justification for shielding the environmentalist from the normal penalties imposed 
for abuse of the legal system. 
37. See note 19 supra. 
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noticed. Actual counteraction cases that illustrate the problems 
faced by environmental plaintiffs are therefore included to help envi-
ronmentalists prepare future strategies. Consideration is also given 
to those defenses generally available to environmentalists. While 
the availability and probability of success of these defenses make a 
finding of liability unlikely, the significance of the defenses must be 
discounted. Affirmative defenses are successful only after substan-
tial trial litigation. When asserted against poorly funded environ-
mentalists with little litigation experience, counteractions can harass 
and instill a fear of liability before this stage is reached. To mini-
mize this harassment, environmentalists need some method of dis-
missing counteractions in the pre-trial stages of the litigation of the 
environmental claim. In attempting to devise a defense that can 
serve this purpose, environmental plaintiffs recently have relied upon 
the first amendment freedom to petition the government. The legal 
theory that underlies this defense and its potential for success are 
discussed in detail. 
A. Defamation 
The tort of defamation38 is the basis for most harassing counter-
actions presumably because many environmentalists attempt to maxi-
mize publicity about activities allegedly damaging the environment. 
Significantly, even though such publicity may appreciably precede 
commencement of an environmental suit, it is in most instances only 
after the environmentalist has brought suit that a counteraction is as-
serted alleging that the prior publicity was defamatory. For ex-
ample, in Adams v. Town of Rockland,39 Adams, contending that 
a proposed subdivision would pollute the Beaverskill River and a 
nearby lake, brought suit against a local zoning board and two land 
developers. Over one year prior to initiating the action, Adams had 
written a letter to the New York Times complaining that the defend-
ant developers had misrepresented the environmental impact of the 
subdivision in a series of advertisements. 40 In a letter to a local 
newspaper, Adams had also charged that the subdivision would pol-
38. Although the law of defamation may vary, causes of action for libel are 
widely recognized throughout the states. See Farmers Educ. & Cooperative Credit 
Union v. WDAY, 360 U.S. 525 (1959). One court has defined libel as follows: 
"Libel is generally understood to be that which is written or printed, and published, 
calculated to injure the reputation of another by bringing him into ridicule, hatred 
or contempt; and lessening the esteem of the victim and injuring him in his trade 
or business are other elements of the tort." Laurence Univ. v. State, 68 Misc. 2d 
408, 413, 326 N.Y.S.2d 617, 624 (Ct. Cl. 1971), revd. OllJ other grounds, 41 App. 
Div. 2d 463, 344 N.Y.S.2d 183 ( 1973 ). Damage to reputation is the essence of libel. 
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1970). 
39. No. 989 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan County, N.Y., filed June 11, 1971 ). 
40. See Answer at 5, Adams v. Town. of Rockland, No. 989 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan 
County, N.Y., filed June 11, 1971) [hereinafter Adams Answer]. 
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lute both the river and the lake. 41 It was only after Adams com-
menced his injunction action that the developers asserted their defa-
mation claim, 42 which alleged that his letters had injured them to 
the extent of $1 million.43 
While many generally recognized defenses are available to an 
environmentalist faced with a defamation counteraction, 44 truth and 
the privilege of fair comment on issues of public concern have been 
the defenses most frequently invoked. 
In most jurisdictions, truth is an absolute defense to charges of 
libel and slander.45 In other jurisdictions, truth is a defense as long 
as publication is made for good motives or for justifiable ends. 46 En-
vironmentalists capable of proving the truth of their publications, 
therefore, have little reason to compromise their claims because of 
defamation counteractions. In many instances, however, it is diffi-
cult to prove the accuracy of the publicized facts. 47 Where the al-
legedly defamatory matter primarily describes visible physical dam-
41. See Adams Answer, supra note 40, at 5-6. 
42. A claim for malicious prosecution was also included in this counterclaim. 
See Adams Answer, supra note 40, at 6. 
43. Another common publicity effort by an environmental plaintiff formed the 
basis for the countersuit in Property Dev. Group v. Irish, No. 7265 (Cir. Ct. 
Washtenaw County, Mich., filed Dec. 14, 1972). In that case, the Little Traverse 
Bay Group had sent newsletters to residents throughout the state that detailed 
the proposed development of the Traverse Bay region and the potential envi-
ronmental problems, and requested contributions to aid in a legal action to halt the 
Cedar Cove construction project. Also included in the countersuit complaint was an 
allegation that the defendant environmentalists had falsely represented to state offi-
cials that the project would destroy certain wetlands. 
44. These defenses include truth, consent, absolute privilege, qualified privilege, 
and fair comment or constitutionally privileged criticism. Jolley v. Valley Publishing 
Co., 63 Wash. 2d 537, 541, 338 P.2d 139, 141 (1964). 
45. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 151 (1967). If, upon a lawful 
occasion for making a publication, an individual has published the truth and no more, 
then there is no sound principle that can make him liable, even if he was actuated 
by malice: if there is a legal right to make the publication and the matter is true, 
the end is justifiable. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964). The raising 
of the defense of truth, however, may turn into a hazardous adventure if its pro-
ponent is unsuccessful. See 56 MICH. L. REv. 659 (1958). Some courts have held 
that the unsuccessful raising of the defense of truth has further published the defam-
atory matter to the hearing of the jury and have thus allowed the unsuccessful plea 
to be considered in aggravation of damages. See Marley v. Providence Journal Co., 
86 R.I. 229, 134 A.2d 180 (1957). 
46. w. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 116, at 797-98 (4th ed. 
1971). This limitation on the truth defense does, however, raise first amendment 
problems. See Farnsworth v. Tribune Co., 43 Ill. 2d 286, 253 N.E.2d 408 (1969). 
See generally Franklin, The Origins and Constitutionality of Limitations on Truth 
as a Defense in Tort Law, 16 STAN. L. R.Ev. 789 (1964). 
47. The environmentalist litigant must show that the truth is as broad as the al-
legedly defamatory statement. Empire Printing Co. v. Roden, 247 F.2d 8, 15 (9th 
Cir. 1957). However, immaterial variances and defects in proof on minor matters 
will be disregarded if the substance of the matter is justified. Stoneking v. Briggs, 
254 Cat. App. 2d 563, 573, 62 Cal. Rptr. 249,256 (1967). 
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age to the environment, 48 the defense can often be established. 
When, as is often the case, the publication largely speculates about 
prospective harm, however, greater difficulty arises. Establishing a 
factual basis for the statement may require expert testimony, which 
may in turn require monetary resources not available to environ-
mentalists. 49 The truth justification, therefore, may be of limited 
utility. 
The overlapping common-law and constitutional privileges of fair 
comment on issues of public concern, which do not require a demon-
stration of truth, 50 will be appealing to environmentalists when the 
truth of the publication is difficult to prove. The common law recog-
nizes a broad privilege for publication of comments on matters of 
public concern. 51 The initial constitutionalization of this privilege 
as a civil liability defense in New York Times v. Sullivan62 covered 
only comments about public officials acting in their official capacity. 
While the scope of this constitutional privilege was later enlarged 
to cover comments on general matters of public concern, 63 the Su-
preme Court's recent decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, lnc.64 re-
stricted its reach essentially to statements concerning "public offi-
cials" or "public figures."55 The constitutional privilege conse-
quently is of little aid to the environmentalist unless the allegedly 
defamatory statement concerned a public official or public figure. 68 
48. See, e.g., Property Dev. Group v. Irish, No. 7265 (Cir. Ct. Washtenaw 
County, Mich., filed Dec. 14, 1972), discussed in note 43 supra. 
49. The problem of costs of expert witnesses bas been solved in some cases by 
the recognition of a "lay expert," i.e., a local citizen with special knowledge of the 
effects of activities upon an area, based on long-time familiarity with that area, 
While the effectiveness of such "lay experts" is unclear, it may help an environ-
mentalist when combined with expert testimony. Sax & DiMento, supra note 24, at 
34-35. 
50. Fairbanks Publishing Co. v. Francisco, 390 P.2d 784, 793 (Alas. 1964). 
51. W. PROSSER, supra note 46, § 118, at 822. 
52. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
53. In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), the Supreme Court 
extended the Sullivan rule to public figures. The plurality opinion in Rosenbloom 
v. Metromedia Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1970), held that it is the issue discussed, rather 
than the individual who is allegedly defamed, that determines the availability of the 
privilege. 
54. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
55. The Court did conclude, however, that while states "may define for them-
selves the appropriate standard of liability for defamatory falsehood injurious to a 
private individual," they cannot impose liability without fault. 418 U.S. at 347 (foot-
note deleted). Moreover, the Court concluded that recovery in defamation cases 
must be limited to actual damages and cannot include presumed and punitive dam-
ages. 418 U.S. at 349-50. 
56. A business may be a public figure under Gertz, but the standard by which 
this is to be determined is unclear. See Note, Corporate Defamation and Product 
Disparagement: Narrowing the Analogy lo Personal Defamation, 15 CoLUM. L. RE.v. 
963, 990-91 (1975). See also Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: 
Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. RE.v, 429, 
470-71 (1971). Furthermore, environmentalists whose allegedly defamatory remarks 
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Whether the allegedly defamatory matter qualifies as a "fair 
comment'' on a matter of "public concern" and is thus protected by 
the common-law privilege is a factual determination presumably de-
pendent upon factors such as the social values at stake, the amount 
of private intrusion, and the public importance of the comment. 57 
Therefore, it is difficult to delineate with· certainty the particularized 
circumstances under which environmentalists could invoke the privi-
lege. Local zoning decisions, grants of construction permits, and en-
vironmentally harmful activities in general are probably of sufficient 
public concern to warrant protection by this qualified privilege. 58 
One significant limitation on the privilege· in many jurisdictions, how-
ever, is that only expressions of "comment" or opinion and not mis-
statements of fact are protected. 59 Although this distinction has 
been vigorously criticized, 60 its existence counsels environmentalists 
to couch their public allegations in terms of opinion rather than fact. 
B. Malicious Prosecution 
Environmentalists at times have been confronted with counterac-
tions alleging malicious prosecution or, as the tort is sometimes 
called, wrongful civil proceedings. 61 Originally a remedy for un-
justifiable criminal proceedings, the malicious prosecution tort in 
most but not all jurisdictions has been extended to cover the wrong-
ful initiation of civil suits. 62 A counteraction based on this tort that 
requests millions of dollars in damages may initially scare inexperi-
enced environmentalists. In light of the elements that must be 
proved in an action for malicious prosecution, however, an environ-
mental claim brought in good faith, even though legally frivolous, 
should not give rise to liability. 
A malicious prosecution counteraction was asserted, for example, 
in Property Development Group v. lrish.63 In early 1972, Irish and 
three other persons formed the Little Traverse Bay Group (L TG), 
an organization designed to protect the natural areas of northern 
Michigan from damaging overdevelopment. Soon thereafter a series 
of confrontations occurred between LTG and the Property Develop-
involved not only dispargement of a business but criticism of the public figure en-
trusted with the regulation of that business may be able to claim the privilege. Cf. 
Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 142 Conn. 605, 116 A.2d 440 (1955). 
57. See La Bruzzo v. Associated Press, 353 F. Supp. 979, 984 (W.D. Mo. 1973). 
58. See Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 142 Conn. 605, 116 A.2d 
440 (1955); W. PROSSER, supra note 46, § 118, at 822-23. 
59. W. PROSSER, supra note 46, § 118, at 819-20. 
60. See Titus, Statement of Fact Versus Statement of Opinion-A Spurious Dis-
pute in Fair Comment, 15 VAND. L. R.Ev. 1203 (1962); 62 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1207 
(1949). 
61. See W. PROSSER, supra note 46, § 120, at 850. 
62. See id. § 120, at 851-52. 
63. No. 7265 (Cir. Ct. Washtenaw County, Mich., filed Dec. 14, 1972). 
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ment Group (PDG), an organization seeking to construct a large 
condominium project along the northern Lake Michigan shoreline. 
LTG devised a multi-faceted program to arrest the project and sent 
two newsletters to citizens of several counties explaining the possible 
environmental impacts of the project and inviting them to make fi-
nancial contributions to the group's efforts. 64 In addition, LTG peti-
tioned a state regulatory agency to deny construction permits for the 
project and, finally, brought suit to enjoin further development of 
the project until several alternative plans were considered. 66 Im-
mediately before trial of this suit, PDG filed a countersuit against 
Irish for $5,750,000 in which it alleged, inter alia, malicious prosecu-
tion, defamation, and interference with prospective economic ad-
vantage. 
Although the counteraction in Irish was never tried, it is ex-
tremely doubtful that the malicious prosecution allegation would 
have succeeded. There are three principal elements to the mali-
cious prosecution cause of action. First, counteraction plaintiffs 
ordinarily must prove the termination of the environmental suit in 
their favor. 66 This requirement typically makes premature both a 
counterclaim for malicious prosecution in the original civil action, 
and a countersuit, as in Irish, prior to termination of the environ-
mental claim. 67 Second, plaintiffs must prove that the environ-
mental proceeding was initiated without probable cause. 68 Environ-
mentalists who have sought advice of counsel in bringing their action 
should have no difficulty disproving this element: If the counsel's 
advice to bring suit was based upon full disclosure of the relevant 
facts by the environmentalists, probable cause for the original action 
will exist. 69 Moreover, it is generally agreed that termination of the 
original claim in favor of the defendant is no evidence that probable 
cause was lacking. 70 Third, plaintiffs must prove "malice" in bring-
64. These two circulars formed the basis for the libel claim asserted in the co1,1n-
tersuit. See Complaint at 6-12, Property Dev. Group v. Irish, No; 7265 (Cir. Ct. 
Washtenaw County, Mich., filed Dec. 14, 1972) [hereinafter Property Dev. Group 
Complaint]. 
65. In this case, Irish v. Property Dev. Group, No. 234-3 (Cir. Ct. Emmet 
County, Mich., March 5, 1973), both temporary and permanent injunctive relief was 
sought. The court refused to grant the permanent injunction although jurisdiction 
to supervise the project was.retained. See Sax & DiMento, supra note 24, at 11. 
66. See, e.g., LaSalle Natl. Bank v. 222 East Chestnut St. Corp., 267 F.2d 247 
(7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 827 (1959). 1t is a favorable not a final 
termination that is required; termination by compromise or settlement is not consid-
ered a favorable termination. Paskle v. Williams, 6 P.2d 505, 214 Cal. Rptr. 482 
(1931). 
67. W. PRossER, supra note 46, § 120, at 853 n.32. 
68. Id. at 854. 
69. See Alexander v. Alexander, 229 F.2d 111 (4th Cir. 1956); W. PROSSER, 
supra note 46, § 121, at 854. 
70. See Ackerman v. Kaufman, 41 Ariz. 110, 15 P.2d 966 (1932). 
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ing the environmental action. 71 Loosely defined in this context, 
"malice" may consist of a primary motive of ill will, a lack of belief 
in any possible success of the action, or a purpose in bringing the 
suit other than the adjudication of the claim. 72 Presumably, any en-
vironmental action brought in good faith will fail to satisfy the malice 
requirement. 
C. Abuse of Process 
The essence of the abuse of process tort is that the judicial proc-
ess in an earlier action, while perhaps initiated with probable cause, 
was used by the former plaintiff for a collateral advantage that is 
not a proper goal of a judicial proceeding. 73 Abuse of process might 
lie, for example, if a business brought an environmental suit with 
the ulterior purpose of forcing a competitor to stop doing business 
in a certain area or with the purpose of extorting the payment of 
a debt. 
For purposes of counteraction harassment, abuse of process is 
superior to malicious prosecution since the plaintiff need show 
neither that the process in the environmental action was obtained 
without probable cause, 74 nor that the prior action was terminated 
in his favor. 75 Abuse of process counteractions, either counterclaims 
or countersuits, can thus be brought while the environmental suit is 
still pending. 76 Yet, environmentalists should have no more to fear 
from abuse of process counteractions than from malicious prosecu-
tion counteractions. An action brought in good faith for the purpose 
of alleviating an allegedly illegal environmental hazard should not 
give rise to liability under either of the tort theories. 77 
D. Economic Relations Torts 
Because environmental actions frequently damage the economic 
expectations of both defendants and nonparties, 78 harassing counter-
actions are often based on business tort theories. Environmental 
71. W. PROSSER, supra note 46, § 120, at 855. 
72. Id. 
73. See, e.g., Weiss v. Hunna, 312 F.2d 711, 717 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 
853 (1963); Holiday Magic, Inc. v. Scott, 4 Ill. App. 3d 962, 282 N.E.2d 452 (1972); 
Hauser v. Bartow, 273 N.Y. 370, 373-74, 7 N.E.2d 268, 269 (1937). 
74. W. PROSSER, supra note 46, § 121, at 856. 
15. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Wilkerson v. Randall, 254 Miss. 546, 180 S.2d 303 (1965). 
78. A third party whose economic interest will be affected by a judgment against 
the defendant may intervene in the original suit and join in a counterclaim against 
the environmental plaintiff. See, e.g., Alpine Lakes Protection Soc. v. Hardin, No. 
8885 (W.D. Wash., filed 1971) (mining company that would have benefited from 
defendant's activities intervened in suit to stop road construction brought against For-
est Service), discussed in Knibb Letter, supra note 20. 
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suits that constrain the conduct of a business have provoked counter-
actions founded on unjustifiable interference with prospective advan-
tage;79 those that threaten to alter rights under an existing contract 
have provoked charges of inducing breach of contract or, more gen-
erally, interference with contractual relations. 80 
In an action for interference with contractual relations, the plain-
tiff must prove that the defendant intentionally interfered with a le-
gal, enforceable contract and thereby injured the plaintiff. 81 Typ-
ically, in the environmental context a complaint will allege that the 
plaintiff has been prevented from performing a contract or that his 
performance has been rendered more burdensome or expensive. 
There is a broad privilege, however, that protects the interfering de-
fendant if his actions have a proper purpose or are prompted by an 
impersonal or disinterested motive of a laudable character.82 In 
particular, several decisions suggest that a privilege exists for actions 
undertaken to protect the public interest. 83 In light of these priv-
ileges, environmentalists rarely should incur liability based on inter-
ference with contractual relations. 
The closely related tort of interference with prospective advan-
tage also should not give rise to liability for actions by environmen-
talists. While a plaintiff need only prove that the defendant inten-
tionally frustrated his reasonable expectations of profit or gain, 84 the 
environmentalist again should escape liability by demonstrating that 
his actions protect a legitimate interest. 85 
Similar to defamation (and perhaps at times confused with it) 
are the torts of injurious falsehood and product disparagement. The 
essence of these torts in the environmental context is that the de-
79. See, e.g., McKeon Corp. v. Kennedy, No. 221454 (Super. Ct. Sacramento 
County, Cal., Jan. 5, 1972); Property Dev. Group v. Irish, No. 7265 (Cir. Ct. Wash• 
tenaw County, Mich., filed Dec. 14, 1972); Apfel v. Cook, No. 926 (Cir. Ct. Antrim 
County, Mich., June 22, 1973). 
80. At least since Lumley v. Gye, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853), a cause of 
action based on unjustifiable intentional interference with .the contract of a third per• 
son has been recognized. Arkansas v. Texas, 346 U.S. 368 (1953). There are four 
essential elements of this cause of action: (1) defendant's knowledge of an existing 
contract; (2) inducement by defendant of a third person to breach of contract; (3) 
subsequent breach by the third person; and (4) damage to the plaintiff. Northern 
Ins. Co. v. Doctor, 23 Ill. App. 2d 225, 228, 161 N.E.2d 867, 869 (1959). Recovery 
may be allowed not only for interference with performance of an existing contract, 
but also for the -interference with a contract that would have been consummated but 
for the wrongful interference. Zoby v. American Fidelity Co., 242 F.2d 76, 79 (4th 
Cir. 1957). 
81. W. PRossER, supra note 46, § 129. 
82. Id. § 129, at 943. 
83. See Legris v. Marcotte, 129 Ill. App. 67 (1906); Radio Station KFH Co. v. 
Musicians Assn. Local 297, 169 Kan. 596, 220 P.2d 199 (1950); Green v. Sam-
uelson, 168 Md. 421, 178 A. 109 (1935); Wholesale Laundry Bd. of Trade v. Tar-
rullo, 103 N.Y.S.2d 23 (Sup. Ct. 1951). 
84. W. PROSSER, supra note 46, § 130, at 950. 
85. Id. § 130, at 953 n.94. 
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fendant has disparaged the plaintiff's business or products and has 
thus caused others not to deal with the plaintiff. 86 These torts are 
more difficult to prove than defamation, for, in addition to proving 
the statement's publication and its disparaging innuendo, the plaintiff 
must prove that the statement is false and that he has suffered actual 
damages. 87 Moreover, the privileges available in defamation ac-
tions, in particular the privilege of fair comment on matters of public 
concern, are available as defenses. 88 Perhaps as a result of these 
difficulties, counteractions have rarely alleged either of these torts. 
E. The Defense of Freedom To Petition the Government 
A counteraction that states a valid claim for relief, even though 
frivolous in light of available defenses, is apt to be judicially consoli-
dated with the environmental claim and not disposed of until the en-
vironmental claim comes to trial. Because pre-trial maneuvers in 
the litigation of the environmental claim are time-consuming, a 
counteraction may, for many months, pressure environmentalists into 
accepting a less desirable settlement. Therefore, environmentalists 
need a defense to counteractions that justifies an immediate dis-
missal of the counteraction for failure to state a claim on which relief 
may be granted. Such a defense, based on the first amendment 
right to petition the government for redress of grievances, has re-
cently been suggested. 89 
Sierra Club v. Butz,90 one of the few counteraction cases reach-
ing the point of decision, involved a counterclaim alleging both inter-
ference with contractual relations and interference with prospective 
advantage. The Sierra Club had brought suit against the Secretary 
of Agriculture and Humboldt Fir, Inc., a private logging company, 
to prevent further logging and road construction in a certain forest 
area until the Secretary could review a request that Congress declare 
the forest a wilderness area. At the time of suit, Humboldt had a 
contract with the Department of Agriculture for timber sales and 
hoped to benefit from the Forest Service's contemplated program to 
expand sales from the area. Humboldt responded swiftly. On the 
same day that the Sierra Club filed its complaint, Humboldt filed 
the initial pleading of its two-count counterclaim that ultimately re-
quested nearly $20 million in damages. The Sierra Club response 
to this counterclaim has profoundly influenced subsequent counter-
action litigation for two reasons: it was the first environmentalist at-
86. Id. § 128. 
87. Id. § 128, at 919-20. 
88. See Gott v. Pulsifier, 122 Mass. 235 (1876); Browning v. Van Rensselaer, 
97 F. 531 (C.C. Pa. 1899). 
89. See Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972). 
90. 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972). 
120 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 74:106 
tempt to confront a harassing counteraction with serious courtroom 
litigation, and it suggested a constitutional framework for defending 
such counteractions. The court dismissed Humboldt's counterclaim 
for failure to state a claim for relief on the ground that the facts it 
alleged amounted to an exercise by the Sierra Club of its right to 
the petition the government. 91 
Because the court's reasoning was rather facile, the arguments 
supporting the constitutional defense are stated here more per-
suasively in order to evaluate the viability of the court's conclusion. 
The court should have applied the constitutional defense in this case 
only after finding that the following four requirements were satis-
fied: first, that the Sierra Club's actions in organizing opposition to 
Humboldt, in petitioning relevant federal agencies, and in bringing 
suit against Humboldt for decl!1fatory and injunctive relief amounted 
to petitioning the government for redress of grievances; second, that 
granting Humboldt damages on its tort counterclaim would constitute 
state action; third, that the state action, if found, would infringe the 
right to petition the government without adequate justification; and 
fourth, that the freedom to petition the government can be employed 
as a defense in a civil suit. 
With regard to the first requirement, the Sierra Club court pre-
sumed that the alleged injury was caused by petitioning the relevant 
federal agencies, notwithstanding Humboldt's allegation, recounted 
by the court, that its injury flowed from all of the Sierra Club's ac-
tivities, including its suit for injunctive and declaratory relief. Be-
cause petitioning federal agencies is clearly within the constitutional 
protection, the court ignored the more difficult question whether the 
commencement of a civil suit constitutes petitioning the govern-
ment. On this issue, the leading decision is NAACP v. Button,°2 
in which the Supreme Court invalidated a state's attempt to preclude 
the NAACP from funding group legal services. The Court con-
cluded that the NAACP activities in organizing and sponsoring litiga-
~ tion constituted political association protected by the first amend-
ment: 
In the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of 
resolving private differences; it is a means of achieving the lawful ob-
jectives of equality of treatment .by all government, federal, state and 
local, for the members of the Negro community in this country. It 
is thus a form of political expression. Groups which find themselves 
unable to achieve their objectives through the ballot frequently turn 
to the courts. . . . [U]nder the conditions of modern government, 
litigation may well be the sole practicable avenue open to a minority 
to petition for redress of grievances. 
91. 349 F. Supp. at 939. 
92. 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
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. . . For such a group, association for litigation may be the most 
effective form of political association. 93 
While the Button Court did not hold that litigation, when engaged 
in for purposes other than resolving private differences, amounts to 
petitioning the government for redress of grievances, its dicta clearly 
suggest that result. Under this analysis, it is arguable that an en-
vironmental organization is petitioning the government even if it 
turns only to the courts for relief rather than, as was the case in Sierra 
Club, principally to administrative agencies. However, the Court 
has not clarified its dicta in Button. Moreover, under Button, envi-
ronmental organizations must demonstrate that their litigation is es-
sentially political expression rather than an attempt to resolve private 
differences-a demonstration that may be difficult if, for example, 
the alleged environmental hazard affects only a small geographic 
area and a limited number of landowners. The determination 
whether litigation is a form of political expression, that is, whether 
plaintiffs are acting as private attorneys-general, is an issue that 
doubtless will be difficult for courts to resolve. 
The Sierra Club court failed to mention the requirement of state 
action. It has long been recognized, however, that, notwithstanding 
the literal language of the first amendment, a state can violate first 
amendment rights without enacting statutory prohibitions or taldng 
affirmative action.94 State acquiescence or indirect participation in 
private conduct designed to deny constitutional rights may effectively 
amount to prohibited state action: "The First Amendment would 
. . . be a hollow premise if it left government free to destroy or 
erode its guarantees by indirect restraints so long as no law is passed 
that prohibits free speech, press, petition, or assembly . . . ."95 
That state action within the contemplation of the fourteenth amend-
ment may exist when state courts adjudicate civil actions between 
private parties was made clear by the Supreme Court in New York 
Times v. Sullivan.96 There the Court, in reversing a libel judgment 
in favor of a public official against publisher-critics of his official con-
duct, found state action in a state court adjudication of a civil claim 
that restricted the constitutional freedoms of the defendant: "The 
test is not the form in which state power has been applied but, what-
ever the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised."97 
Environmentalists can analogously argue that state action occurs 
when a state creates the cause of action upon which the counterac-
93. 371 U.S. at 429-31. 
94. See District 12, United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Assn., 389 U.S. 
217 (1967). 
95. District 12, United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Assn., 389 U.S. 217, 
222 (1967). 
96. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
97. 376 U.S. at 265. 
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tion is based, adjudicates its merits, and ultimately awards damages 
and enforces the judgment. 
With regard to the third requirement, the court in Sierra Club 
apparently assumed that no state interests could justify state action 
restricting a genuine exercise of the freedom to petition the govern-
ment: "[L]iability can be imposed for activities ostensibly consist-
ing of petitioning the government for redress of grievances only if 
the petitioning is a 'sham' and the real purpose is not to obtain gov-
ernmental action, but to otherwise injure the plaintiff."88 This abso-
lute view of the first amendment freedom is difficult to support and, 
indeed, conflicts with dicta in Button to the effect that state interests 
in regulating the solicitation of legal work could support a narrow 
statutory limitation on first amendment freedoms. 00 Because state 
interests can justify infringement in some situations, courts must 
weigh conflicting interests and forgo an absolutist position. States 
have significant interests in allowing their residents to recover for 
injuries suffered.100 The extent to which these interests support re-
strictions on the freedom to petition, an issue that should in the fu-
ture prove of considerable interest to environmentalists, was unfor-
tunately left unclarified in Sierra Club. 
The fourth requirement-that the freedom to petition the gov-
ernment be available as a defense to a civil action-was found satis-
fied by the court in Sierra Club after substantial inquiry. The start-
ing point of the court's two-pronged analysis was the Supreme 
Court's recognition in New York Times v. Sullivan that the constitu-
tional freedoms of speech and press can be employed as affirmative 
defenses to common-law tort actions for defamation of public offi-
cials. Upon finding that the right to petition the government is inti-
mately connected with these first amendment freedoms, 101 the court 
concluded that it also could be used as a defense. Sullivan involved 
a limited constitutionalization of a defense historically recognized in 
defamation cases at common law-the defense of fair comment on 
issues of public concern. Because no common-law defense existed 
analogous to the constitutional right to petition the government, Sul-
livan arguably is distinguishable. This distinction is specious, how-
ever, for if tort-action defendants were prohibited from raising their 
right to petition as a defense, they would effectively be prohibited 
from protecting that constitutional right. Thus, it seems fair to as-
sume that where a tort suit that constitutes state action unjustifiably 
infringes defendants' right to petition the government, that right can 
be raised as a defense. 
98. 349 F. Supp. at 939. 
99. 371 U.S. at 438-43. 
100. Cf., e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
101. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945). 
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In sum, environmentalists should face two principal obstacles to 
employing the right to petition the government as a defense justify-
ing dismissal of a counteraction. First, they must demonstrate that 
their activities are petitions to the government rather than requests 
to resolve private disputes, and second, they must show that state 
interests in compensating those' tortiously injured fail to justify in-
fringements of the right to petition the government. Environmen-
talists are aided by the fact that several courts have followed the lead 
of Sierra Club in recognizing the defense. A California superior 
court, in McKean Construction Corp. v. Kennedy,102 virtually incor-
porated the text of the Sierra Club decision into its own opinion in 
dismissing an interference with prospective advantage countersuit 
against several individuals who had petitioned a local zoning agency 
to deny zoning changes requested by a land developer. Because the 
environmentalists in that suit actually petitioned a governmental 
agency rather than requested judicial relief, the first principal ob-
stacle was overcome without difficulty. In Apfel v. Cook,103 a Mich-
igan court dismissed a countersuit alleging that the environmentalists 
had, inter alia, caused damage by persuading a local township to en-
act restrictive zoning ordinances. The court concluded that "[t]he 
acts of Defendants as alleged appear in almost every instance to rep-
resent Constitutionally privileged activity."104 
The right to petition the government for redress of grievances 
seems destined to become increasingly important to environmental- · 
ists as a defense to civil damage actions.105 Significantly, many state 
constitutions recognize a right to petition the government, 106 and en-
vironmentalists have pressed these provisions as a basis for recogni-
tion of a civil damages defense.107 
ill. SoLUTIONS 
An acceptable solution to the counteraction problem must pre-
vent the tactic from discouraging litigation, must take into account 
the limited resources of plaintiffs and the judiciary, and must recog-
nize the right of defendants to assert valid claims. A basic goal of 
our system of justice is to accord every individual possessing a meri-
102. No. 221454 (Super. Ct. Sacramento County, Cal., Jan. 5, 1973). 
103. No. 926 (Cir. Ct. Antrim County, Mich., June 23, 1973). 
104. No. 926 at 2 (Cir. Ct. Antrim County, Mich., June 23, 1973). 
105. Lawyers for environmentalists have been quick to seize upon this defense. 
See, e.g., Defendants' Brief in Support of Motion for Accelerated Judgment at 20-
22, Property Dev. Group v. Irish, (Cir. Ct. Washtenaw County, Mich., filed Dec. 
14, 1972). 
106. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 25; DEL. CoNST. art. I, § 16; ILL. CONST. 
art. I, § 5; MAss. CoNST. part I, art. xix; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 3; N.Y. CONST. 
art. I,§ 9; WASH. CONST. art. I,§ 4. 
107. See, e.g., Three Lakes Assn. Complaint, supra note 20. 
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torious claim an opportunity to have it adjudicated. This goal is un-
dermined by harassing counteractions that coerce the withdrawal or 
compromise of legitimate environmental claims. While the rules of 
procedure in most jurisdictions provide for accelerated dismissal of 
nonmeritorious claims, 108 in the context of environmental counterac-
tions these rules insufficiently reduce harassment and unnecessary 
litigation expenses. Any solution must confront this problem. 
A. Reply by Counteraction 
The counteraction tactic is not exclusively reserved for defend-
ants. Environmental plaintiffs confronted with harassing counterac-
tions could respond with counteractions of their own based on ma-
licious prosecution or abuse of process theories and, where appropri-
ate, on alleged deprivations of state and federal constitutional rights. 
This tactic is of little aid, however, to poorly financed environmental-
ists, inexperienced in litigation. 
The limitations on the use of plaintiffs' counteractions are illus-
trated in Three Lakes Association v. Whiting.109 In 1970, Three 
Lakes Association and its individual members brought suit request-
ing injunctive relief against a group of land developers who were 
seeking to construct a large condominium project on Torch Lake in 
northern Michigan. 110 Although the court refused to enjoin con-
struction, it retained jurisdiction in case of subsequent environmental 
problems.111 In 1971, seeking to prevent future opposition to con-
struction, the land developers instituted a countersuit112 against the 
original environmental plaintiffs that requested $2.5 million in dam-
ages and alleged, inter alia, interference with prospective economic 
advantage and defamation.113 Several days before serving process 
on the environmentalists, the developers allegedly offered to with-
draw all of their claims if the environmentalists would agree not to 
oppose their plans for an apartment project.114 The environmental-
108. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 56. 
109. No. 74-025-272 (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich., Jan. 1975). 
110. This underlying suit was Blunt v. Apfel, No. 849 (Cir. Ct. Antrim County, 
Mich., Nov. 19, 1970). Even before the filing of the environmentalist counteraction, 
Professor Sax had described this confrontation between the environmentalists and the 
developers as "a classic knockdown, drag-out affair." Sax & DiMento, supra note 
24, at 9 n.33. 
111. Sax & DiMento, supra note 24, at 9. 
112. Apfel v. Cook, No. 926 (Cir. Ct. Antrim County, Mich., June 23, 1973), 
was not maintained against all of the original plaintiffs. The Complaint in Three 
Lakes Association alleges that one original plaintiff was not named "because of as-
surances {from the excluded party] that he would cease being a plaintiff in action 
849 [Blunt v. Apfel] ••. and cease otherwise to express freely opposition to defend-
ant project." Three Lakes Assn. Complaint, supra note 20, at 12. 
113. Three Lakes Assn. Complaint, supra note 20, at 12; Sax & DiMento, supra 
note 24, at 22. 
114. Three Lakes Assn. Complaint, supra note 20, at 13. 
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ists' refusal to assent to this proposal was· followed by nearly four 
years of litigation, and culminated in a countersuit by the environ-
mentalists against the developers. The environmentalists' $2.7 mil-
lion damage request was based on three theories, each grounded in 
the developers' alleged misconduct of their countersuit litigation: 
abuse of process in bringing the countersuit, 115 breach of an agree-
ment to settle the countersuit, 116 and violations of state and federal 
constitutional rights.117 
As evidenced by Three Lakes Association, a counteraction by 
environmentalist plaintiffs does not preclude the assertion of chilling 
counteractions by defendants and is at best only a costly confronta-
tion device available after the environmentalist plaintiff has incurred 
substantial litigation expenses. Indeed, it may be financially impos-
sible for many environmentalists to assert a counteraction, although 
mitigation of this expense factor is possible if environmental groups 
can retain lawyers on a contingent fee basis. Moreover, the prospect 
of prolonged litigation may be undesirable to an individual or ad hoc 
group whose original purpose was to remedy a single environmen-
tal danger rather than to become an entrenched spokesman for the 
public interest. Finally, widespread use of the "environmentalist 
counteraction" would ultimately result in increased court congestion. 
A solution that prevents the assertion of harassing counteractions in 
the first instance would increase judicial economy. 
B. The Judgment-Proof Corporation 
One means of mitigating counteraction harassment by reducing 
environmentalist fears is to shield environmental plaintiffs from ex-
tensive financial liability by forming judgment-proof corporations.118 
Prior to instituting the environmental action, individuals and ad hoc 
groups could, with the aid of an attorney, comply with the generally 
expedient and inexpensive requirements for corporate formation119 
and supply the corporation with only enough assets to cover the costs 
115. Id. at 1-30. 
116. Id. at 37. 
117. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), the complaint alleged that the develop-
ers acted under color of state law to deprive the environmentalists of rights "[u]nder 
the Constitution of the United States, particularly the First, Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments thereto." Three lAkes Assn. Complaint, supra note 20, at 31. A simi-
lar allegation was made regarding rights guaranteed under the Michigan constitution. 
Id. at 33. These claims were all rejected by the court. 
118. Incorporation for the purpose of avoiding unlimited liability is recognized 
in most jurisdictions. The prevailing rule is that where corporate formalities are pre-
served, initial funding reasonably adequate, and the corporation is not formed for the 
purpose of evading an existing obligation, the members enjoy limited liability. H. 
HENN, CORPORATIONS § 146, at 250 (2d ed. 1970). 
119. Primary requirements include the drafting and filing of articles of incorpora-
tion with state and local officials, publication of a notice of incorporation, and the 
drafting of corporate bylaws. Id. § 118, at 197. 
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of anticipated litigation. Because judgments rendered against the 
corporation would be virtually uncollectible, counteractions would be 
considerably less effective in creating fear of extensive liability and 
thus might not be asserted in the first instance. This proposal is 
therefore appealing in that it reduces both court time and litigation 
expenses of environmentalists. 
Nevertheless, the judgment-proof corporation concept has sev-
eral troubling aspects.12° First, a court might lift the corporate veil 
and hold individual environmentalists liable for any judgment. 
While the criteria courts would employ in deciding whether to disre-
gard the corporate entity are uncertain, 121 courts have disregarded 
the corporate entity in other contexts when it was used to defeat pub-
lic convenience, to justify a wrong, or to insulate a fraud or crime.122 
Arguably, forming a judgment-proof corporation for the sole purpose 
of litigating is a type of constructive fraud since the corporate entity 
is erected principally to secure the benefits of the judicial forum for 
certain individuals without exposing them to the corresponding re-
sponsibilities imposed by that forum. A court therefore might im-
pose liability on the corporate shareholders. A second difficulty is 
that the judgment-proof corporation provides no protection against 
suits brought against the individual members or -shareholders of the 
corporation. Thus, notwithstanding the existence of the corporation, 
a defendant could harass by asserting a countersuit against one or 
more of the individual members of the judgment-proof corporation. 
The most significant difficulty with allowing environmentalists to 
use judgment-proof corporations to avoid counteraction liability is its 
unfairness to counteraction plaintiffs possessing meritorious claims. 
Judicial recognition of the corporate entity might unjustly deny com-
pensation on a valid claim for relief and might thereby insulate 
wrongdoers from responsibility for their acts. While this undesirable 
consequence presumably would inhibit few environmentalists from 
attempting to utilize this tactic, it derogates from the attractiveness 
120. The claims and relief available to an environmentalist group taking the cor-
porate form may be limited. Although the standing of a corporation to assert the 
rights of its members in seeking injunctive relief may be available when at least some 
claim of damage to public lands is made, standing to seek damages based on its mem-
bers' claims of injucy to privately held land may not be. See Delaware Citizens for 
Clean Air, Inc. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 367 F. Supp. 1040, 1047 (D. Del. 1973 ). B111 
see Inglewood Residents' Protective Assn. v. Los Angeles, 6 Env. Rep. Cas. 123S 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1974). Since damages are not the primary objective of most environ-
mental litigation, this limitation is not troubling. There remain, however, some in-
stances in which the corporate plaintiff may be at a disadvantage because of the cause 
of action upon which it must rely. Cf. Village of Bensenville v. City of Chicago, 
16 Ill. App. 3d 733, 738, 306 N.E.2d 562, 566 (1973) (federal law preemption pre-
cluded suit by municipality for injunction but not its individual citizens' suits based 
on theory of inverse condemnation). 
121. For most purposes, the corporate entity is separate from its individual mem-
bers. Flink v. Paladini, 279 U.S. 59 (1929). 
122. See, e.g., Burnet v. Commonwealth Improvement Co., 287 U.S. 41S (1932). 
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of the judgment-proof corporation as an equitable solution to the 
counteraction problem. 
C. Statutory Bonding Requirement 
Adequately funded environmentalists generally can weather 
counteraction harassment and, as evidenced by the fact that counter-
actions are no longer brought against national environmental organ-
izations,123 may often be immune from counteractions in the first in-
stance. This characteristic of the counteraction strategy suggests 
that one partial solution to the problem might be to require counter-
action plaintiffs to post a security bond for environmentalist litiga-
tion expenses incurred in defending the counteraction. Such a pro-
vision could resemble those that require security bonding in share-
holder derivative actions.124 The amount of security could be sub-
ject to increase if the course of the litigation reveals that it is inade-
quate or to decrease if it proves excessive. Payment of environmen-
talist litigation expenses by the counteraction plaintiffs could be re-
quired upon a judicial determination that the counteraction was in-
terposed largely for harassment purposes. Judicial economy is pro-
moted to the extent that this proposal discourages the initial assertion 
of harassing counteractions. This initial discouragement, coupled 
with potential reimbursement of litigation expenses when asserted 
counteractions camouflage harassment motives, could assure envi-
ronmentalists relatively open access to the judicial process. How-
ever, the constitutionality and fairness of the proposal are subject to 
question. 
Any mandatory security requirement is subject to challenge as 
an unconstitutional deprivation of due process of law since its 
acknowledged effect is to inhibit access to the judicial process by 
certain litigants.125 In general, the validity of a security requirement 
turns upon its reasonableness in the context within which it is im.~ 
posed. In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,126 the Su-
preme Court upheld a New Jersey statute requiring shareholders 
with relatively small interests in a corporation to post reasonable se-
curity for litigation expenses prior to commencing a shareholder de-
rivative suit: "A state may set the terms on which it will permit liti-
gation in its courts . . . . It cannot seriously be said that a state 
makes such unre~onable use of its power as to violate the Constitu-
tion when it provides liability and security for payment of reasonable 
123. See note 18 supra. 
124. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. I.Aw § 627 (McKinney 1974). These statutes 
provide, inter alia, that shareholders possessing less than a certain percentage or -dol-
lar value of stock must post reasonable security before bringing a derivative action. 
12S. See Cohen v. Beneficial Ind. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. S41, 552. (1948). 
126. 337 U.S. S41 (1948). 
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expenses if a litigation of this character is adjudged to be unsustain-
able."127 While acknowledging that security requirements deter lit-
igation, the Court concluded that a state could close its courts when 
the requirement of reasonable security was not met. 
The application of the Cohen standard to security requirements 
for environmental counteractions raises several issues. First, it is ar-
guable that the Cohen result applies only in the specialized context 
of shareholder derivative actions. The Court itself noted that a 
state's interest in preserving the fiduciary duties owed by sharehold-
ers to their corporation constitutes a compelling reason for regulating 
derivative actions.128 Second, the regulation upheld in Cohen im-
posed security requirements only in the limited circumstances when 
a shareholder held less than either 5 per cent or $50,000 worth of 
stock. It is thus possible that a broad security requirement covering 
all environmental counteractions would not be upheld.12° Finally, 
a court might consider it unfair to require countersuit plaintiffs to 
post substantial security when environmentalist plaintiffs are re-
quired to post at most a modest bond.130 
D. Statutory Postponement of Counteractions 
A final possible solution to the counteraction problem is to post-
pone counteractions by statute until termination of the environmental 
claim. Such a statute would have to preserve explicitly the right to 
bring counteractions at that time and would have to toll the statute 
of limitations on the environmentalists' activities while the environ-
mental claim is being litigated. This proposal presumably would re-
duce the harassment and fear of liability engendered by counterac-
tions and reduce the incidence of frivolous counteractions. 
While no existing environmental legislation contains such a lim-
itation, an analogous framework exists under summary repossession 
statutes currently in force in many states.131 The hearing on a re-
121. 337 U.S. at 549. 
128. 337 U.S. at 552. 
129. Courts considering the applicability of bonding requirements have given 
them a rather limited reading. In refusing to make a plaintiff who had satisfied the 
5 per cent or $50,000 requirement pay a defendant's litigation expenses when the de• 
fondant prevailed, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that security for expense 
legislation "was not intended to discourage derivative actions generally ••• but only 
to prevent 'abuses attending the maintenance of such actions by persons whose finnn• 
cial stake in the corporation is slight.'" Shapiro v. Magaziner, 418 Pa. 278, 281, 
210 A.2d 890, 892 (1965). 
130. See Florida Environmental Protection Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 14B, § 
403.412(f) (1975) (providing that the prevailing party is entitled costs and attorneys' 
fees and authorizing the court to order a plaintiff of doubtful solvency to post "a 
good and sufficient surety bond or cash"); Michigan Environmental Protection Act, 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 691.1202a (Supp. 1974) (imposing a maximum of $500). 
131. See, e.g., ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 57, § 5 (Smith-Hurd 1972); MICH. COMP, 
LAws ANN.§§ 600.5714-.5732 (Supp. 1975). 
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quest for summary repossession is generally limited to determining 
who is entitled to the property and defendants are proscribed from 
introducing extraneous issues: "The defendant may under a general 
denial of the allegations of the complaint give in evidence any mat-
ter in defense of the action. No matters not germane to the distinc-
tive purpose of the proceeding shall be introduced by joinder, 
counterclaim or otherwise."132 Such statutes apply only to defend-
ants and generally do not prohibit defendants from bringing counter-
suits against the plaintiffs before the plaintiffs' claims are finally 
adjudicated. To postpone counteractions in the environmental con-
text, the statute would need to apply to third parties as well as to 
defendants and should prohibit countersuits in addition to counter-
claims. 
Constitutional issues are raised, however, by any provision limit-
ing an individual's access to the judicial process. It is well settled 
that the due process clause prohibits a state from eliminating essen-
tial issues from the original hearing of a case.133 Since the proposed 
provision preserves a defendant's opportunity to present any valid 
defense, this prohibition presumably is not violated. Due process 
also requires, however, that issues be heard in a meaningful manner 
and at a meaningful time.134 The proposed provision as applied 
could at times run afoul of this constitutional mandate. While sum-
mary repossession proceedings are rapid, discovery and pre-trial pro-
cedures in environmental litigation may easily last months or even 
years.135 Effective denial of the right to be heard at a meaningful 
time thus might result from delaying a defendant's right to bring a 
countersuit against an environmentalist. Between initiation and set-
tlement of the environmental claim, conditions could change, wit-
nesses could disappear, and possible evidence could become stale 
or unavailable. Courts are not likely to uphold such legislation when 
its practical effect in a given situation is to foreclose a defendant's 
opportunity to assert his claims. 
This proposal is desirable, however, in that it should decrease 
the incidence of frivolous counteractions and increase the percentage 
of environmental claims fairly settled. Necessarily, a statute requir-
ing postponement of counteractions pending litigation of an environ-
132. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 57, § 5 (Supp. 1975). 
133. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 
(1970); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965). 
134. The Supreme Court appears to be willing to uphold limiting statutes so long 
as such statutes provide for a full hearing on all claims by the litigants at a mean-
ingful time subsequent to the original proceeding. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 
56 (1972). 
135. For those cases litigated under the Michigan Environmental Protection Act 
before 1974, the mean length of completed cases was ten months, the median seven 
months, and the range, from one to thirty-four months. Sax & DiMento, supra note 
24, at 8. 
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mental claim forces separate treatment of issues springing from the 
same transaction and concerning the same parties. Judicial ineffi-
ciency, however, should not result since defendants presumably 
would bring counteractions only in the instances when their claims 
were meritorious or when they anticipated that the same environmen-
talists would institute claims against them in the future. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As more environmentalists seek judicial aid in remedying envi-
ronmental harm, use of the counteraction tactic is likely to increase. 
Unfortunately, there exists no easy solution to this problem. Any leg-
islative solution, moreover, is apt to encounter significant opposition 
from those expecting to be defendants in, or to be affected by, en-
vironmental suits. Perhaps the most efficient solution, which is out-
side the realm of legislation and planning, is for the environmental 
plaintiffs to realize that harassing counteractions do not realistically 
threaten extensive financial liability. As was suggested by an at-
torney who has had extensive experience handling counteraction 
threats: "There is no real answer to the problems posed by defend-
ants whose defense consists of threats and intimidations excepting 
a tough plaintiff and a tough plaintiff's attorney."136 
136. Wilcox Letter, supra note 21. 
